MES / historian, read only across OT/IT
Everything is read only, the agent can observe the plant, never actuate it.
Open the live lab · preloaded to this scenario
MCP Server Contract Workbench
Context
A plant ops copilot sits on the IT side of the OT/IT boundary. The MES/historian server exposes only read tools, machine status, OEE, tag history. There is no write tool at all, so nothing the agent does can actuate equipment.
The decision
Read only resource design is the OT safety guarantee: the absence of any write tool, not a permission setting, is what makes the copilot safe on the plant floor.
What most miss
People add a 'set_setpoint' tool behind an approval and think they're safe. On OT the guarantee people trust is the one that's structurally impossible, no write tool exists.
Stakes
A single actuation path from an IT side agent onto OT equipment is a safety of life risk, not an incident ticket.
Studied · Agent Architecture and Protocol Strategy Artifacts · verified 2026-07-03
Sources: OT/IT segmentation (Purdue model) and read-only integration patterns; MES / historian (OPC-UA) data exposure practice